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The WTO dispute settlement system is in crisis, endangering the future of the organization. The 
proximate reason for alarm is the dwindling number of Appellate Body (AB) members, the result of the 
United States blocking new appointments as the terms of sitting members expire. The AB crisis usually 
is presented as the U.S. against the world. In this paper, we report on the results of a survey of WTO 
Members’ perceptions of the AB and the role it plays (should play) and contrast this with Members’ 
revealed preferences in their use of the dispute settlement system and their intervention in WTO debates 
about the crisis. The data reveal strong support for the basic de-sign of the dispute settlement system but 
also that the United States is not alone in perceiving that the AB has gone beyond its mandate. 
Keywords 
WTO, Appellate Body, dispute settlement, conflict resolution. 
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The WTO dispute settlement system is in crisis, endangering the future of the organization. The 
proximate reason for alarm is the dwindling number of Appellate Body (AB) members, the result of the 
United States blocking new appointments as the terms of sitting members expire. The US has been doing 
this since 2017.1 As a result, at the time of writing the number of AB members has dropped to three. On 
December 11, 2019 there will be only one AB member, making the appeals function of the WTO 
dysfunctional, given that a minimum of three AB members are needed to consider an appeal of a panel 
report. Panels keep being established however, suggesting WTO Members continue to have confidence 
in the dispute settlement system even if this might eventually, unless a last-minute change of heart 
occurs, not include the AB. Moreover, the rest of the WTO institutional apparatus remains active, 
including plurilateral deliberation/negotiation on different subjects and the possibility to raise “specific 
trade concerns” (STCs) in Committees. Moreover, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and its 
associated scrutiny of national trade-related policies, continues to contribute to transparency in this 
regard.  
While the end of the AB would not spell the end of the WTO, many WTO Members have made it 
clear that they think the demise of the AB is a problem. One reason, depending on the eventual 
interpretation of Article 17 of the DSU, could be that panel reports may no longer be adopted 
automatically. This will be the case if losing parties appeal into the void, therefore leaving the case 
unresolved. The main fear is that without the AB, the WTO dispute settlement system will lose much of 
its predictability, and may eventually, collapse. This in turn has potentially major consequences for 
future rule-making efforts in the WTO, as the value of negotiated outcomes depends on the ability of 
signatories to enforce them.  
The AB crisis is usually presented as the U.S. against the world. Clearly, absent US resistance to 
(re)appoint members of the AB, we would not be facing the current crisis. The situation, nevertheless, 
is more complicated. In fact, as we will attempt to demonstrate, even though no WTO member would 
adopt a US-style reaction to express its dissatisfaction with the workings of the AB, there are countries 
that share some of the grievances that the US delegation has advanced before the WTO. 
In this paper, we ask how WTO Members regard the AB and the role it plays (should play). More 
specifically, we ask a series of interconnected questions aiming to illuminate the attitudes of the WTO 
membership towards the AB, and, in turn, advance a few thoughts on what should be done about it. We 
ask the following questions:  
 Is the AB fight a tempest in a small teapot affecting primarily a subset of the WTO membership, 
distracting attention from ways to manage conflict in the trading system that are potentially more 
valuable? 
 Does the trade policy community think the AB has delivered on their expectations? 
 Do Members regard the importance of dispute settlement in the same way? 
                                                     
* This paper was prepared with financial assistance from the Bertelsmann Stiftung and is part of a broader re-search project 
on WTO reform being undertaken with the Global Economic Dynamics team (see www.ged-project.de). We are grateful 
to Christian Bluth for his support in the preparation of this paper, to feedback on the survey questions from national officials 
working on WTO matters, and the assistance provided by many re-spondents in forwarding and raising awareness of the 
survey in their respective communities. 
1 Already in 2016, the US had refused to join the consensus to re-appoint Sheung Wa, a Korean national, who was forced to 
resign. After that incident, the US did not oppose the appointment of his successor, Hyung Chong Kim, or oppose the 
appointment of Mrs. Hong, a Chinese national, who succeeded Mrs. Zhang, the first ever Chinese member of the AB. Since 
then the US has opposed every (re-)appointment. 
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 Is WTO dispute settlement reform of concern only to a small group of large countries and major 
exporters, as one might expect based on extensive research in political science and economics on 
the incentives for countries to use the WTO dispute settlement system? 
Our research suggests that many WTO Members may not consider the AB fight to be one they are 
directly concerned with. Still, one would legitimately expect frequent users of DS to be the main 
protagonists in debates about keeping the AB operational, as the AB demise has direct consequences on 
the prospects of bringing and winning cases. In this vein, we first consider Members’ revealed 
preferences in their use of the dispute settlement system and their intervention in debates about the crisis. 
We complement the data on participation in the DSB (either as complainants and/or respondents, or in 
the realm of discussions regarding the crisis in the AB) with an original survey of perceptions of WTO 
dispute settlement that we conducted among practitioners and knowledgeable observers in 2019. This 
provides new information on the views of governments regarding WTO DS, as well as those held by 
practitioners and stakeholders who are directly involved in or affected by WTO DS. This data reveals a 
split among the “frequent flyers”— many of those who use dispute settlement most intensely participate 
actively in the DSB discussions on the AB, but some do not, suggesting that not all frequent users are 
equally concerned to keep matters as they are. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents our hypotheses and the survey methodology. 
Section 2 describes the data used. Section 3 discusses patterns of participation by WTO members in DS 
and in DSB deliberations on the AB. Section 4 turns to the survey on insider perceptions and discusses 
the relationship between participation in the survey and the pattern of engagement by WTO Members 
in DS and the DSB. In Section 5, we present the main findings of the survey, and in Section 6, we recap 
the key points of this research, and our main conclusions. 
1. Hypotheses and Methodology 
The deadlock on WTO dispute settlement has several characteristics.  
 First, it is AB-centered: the focus is on the operation of the second instance review function. In 
fact, although some of the issues raised matter for panels as well (e.g., overstepping the mandate; 
observing statutory deadlines for issuing final reports), neither the US, nor anyone else has brought 
this issue to the table; 
 Second, the US is the instigator. The US voice has strengthened and intensified over the years, as 
it built up on its criticism of AB practice to blocking appointments, and eventually leading the AB 
out of business. The concerns regarding the operation of the AB is not something recent, but the 
intensity of the US criticism has increased over time;  
 Third, most of the time most of the WTO membership has been passive in the sense of not 
engaging with the US critique, whether in support or in opposition. This attitude changed with the 
realization that the US is willing to drive the AB out of business. 
There are two broad hypotheses regarding possible systemic concerns associated with the operation of 
the AB.2 First, that the AB has overstepped its mandate. This is the core element of US criticism and is 
disaggregated in various elements ranging from the AB’s neglect of the deferential standard of review 
in antidumping litigation to disrespecting the statutory deadlines for issuing reports. Second, that the 
AB is not doing a good enough job, reflected in inconsistency of rulings and a case law that lacks 
coherence, and thus does not provide the predictability governments and businesses need. This is the 
critique that academics usually raise (Mavroidis, 2016), but not the US. In fact, the US wishes to 
downgrade the importance of precedent, the quintessential element for securing predictability.  
                                                     
2 Note that criticism of specific rulings in any given case is not evidence of systemic concern (such as claims of overstepping 
the mandate). We do not focus on case-specific criticism, which clearly is salient for the US, notably AB rulings regarding 
the use of zeroing in antidumping investigations. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827215
WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members’ Revealed Preferences 
European University Institute 3 
Insofar as acquiescence can be inferred from the absence of explicit disagreement with the US, this 
may reflect support for either or both hypotheses. Asking countries to elucidate their views on this matter 
through a survey is the main motivation for this paper. We ask the question whether we are indeed facing 
a widely shared concern regarding the performance of the AB, and the WTO dispute settlement system 
in more general terms, as opposed to the current deadlock simply being an expression of the 
idiosyncratic policy towards trade and the WTO taken by the Trump Administration. If there is little 
evidence for the former there may not be a need to do much at this stage—Members may be able to wait 
for a new US Administration.3 If there is evidence of more widespread concern, there is a need to address 
seriously the matter as a priority issue.  
The question whether the WTO DS, and, more specifically, the operation of the AB is a real concern 
to many WTO Members, is critical and largely a black box. There are many suggestions on “what to 
do” that assume a (large) majority is happy with the status quo ante and seek to maintain as much of it 
as possible. This is the case for most proposals made in the DSB, most notably the proposal to move 
forward expeditiously with new appointments to the AB. On October 29, 2019 the US delegation to the 
WTO declared that it could not join a proposal by 88 WTO Members (counting the 28 EU member 
states as one) to move ahead and complete the AB by appointing the missing members.4 On this matter, 
there is an abyss between the US and most of the WTO membership. While some WTO Members might 
share some of the concerns of the US, they differ on the question how go about addressing them. The 
overwhelming majority would rather keep the AB in place and try to improve it, rather than burn the 
village to save it, as the US Administration suggests (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2019a, 2019b). 
With this important caveat, our focus in this paper is on trying to generate information whether the 
concerns expressed by the US delegation to the WTO are widely shared. We explore if others share the 
core issues raised by the US, and whether there are distinct, additional or different matters that concern 
a broader cross-section of stakeholders. Our null hypotheses are that:  
 • the way the AB has been functioning is in disrespect of its institutional mandate;  
 • this is not (regarded as) very relevant to most WTO members because DS and the AB dispute 
is mostly a matter that concerns the biggest players, notably the EU and US; an  
 • it is mostly a cottage industry that matters to ‘insiders’ such as lawyers involved in cases and 
academics who study them. 
Our aim is to better understand the attitude of both the Members which are active in dispute settlement 
and debates, and those who are not. Members who do not engage in debate also do not make much use 
of the dispute settlement system.5 Those who do not respond to the survey also do not use the DSU or 
engage in DSB deliberations on the AB. Why they do not do so may reflect various factors – including 
free riding incentives, capacity constraints and simply lack of interest. Lack of interest may reflect 
perceptions that the system is of little salience to them (to their exporters) because of the remedies that 
are on offer, an inability to retaliate (the WTO is self-enforcing), insufficient access to legal expertise, 
information asymmetries (a lack of knowledge about injurious violations of WTO commitments, 
inadequate means for talking to their firms), or a view that they have other means of solving trade 
conflict, either in the WTO (committees) or elsewhere. The extant empirical research literature has 
shown that that several of these factors are relevant in explaining use of the WTO. The survey aims in 
part to get a better sense of perceptions of WTO stakeholders/practitioners whether (and which) such 
factors play a role. 
                                                     
3 Of course, this may well be wishful thinking given that Obama Administration was also unhappy with the AB, as are 
influential US law firms and lobbyists. Even if the US is alone in its views, the problem may persist under a new US 
administration. 
4 WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.14, 20 September. 
5 Maybe many of the countries who are silent in the DSB also do not notify, or ask questions in committees, or engage 
actively in negotiations. Unfortunately, we have no data in these dimensions of participation.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827215
Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Petros Mavroidis, Maarja Saluste and Robert Wolfe 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
2. Data 
We use two sources of data. The first is based on participation by WTO Members in the WTO. We focus 
on whether Members act as complainants in WTO dispute settlement procedures as one indicator of 
engagement and “revealed preferences” – a presumption being that those who use the system (more) 
can be expected to engage (more) in deliberations on reform and efforts to address the AB crisis. We 
have also collected data regarding the frequency (number) of WTO Members’ interventions on matters 
relating to the operation of the AB, and appointments of AB members, in the regular meetings of the 
DSB. Our interest here is to identify the “frequent flyers” and to distinguish these WTO Members from 
those that have not acted as complainants (have not invoked the DSU by submitting disputes), and have 
not intervened in DSB meetings regarding the performance of the AB. We have obtained information 
on use of the DSU and participation in the DSB from the minutes of the DSB meetings.6 We aggregate 
this data for the period between January 2017 and September 2019 by counting how many times a given 
WTO Member speaks in the DSB on agenda items concerning new appointments to the AB and the 
operation of the AB.7 
We complement the data on DSB participation with an on-line, anonymous survey comprising 35 
questions ranging from satisfaction with the output of the AB to the intensity of participation in dispute 
settlement to the capacity to do so. Fiorini et al. (2019) lists all the questions asked and provides 
descriptive information on responses received. The questionnaire design was informed by consultations 
and informal testing with several experts and selected WTO delegations, and by our review of the 
extensive literature on who uses WTO dispute settlement. The on-line survey ran for 3 months (mid-
June to mid-September 2019). The link to the online questionnaire was sent to all WTO delegations with 
an accompanying email explaining the purpose of the exercise, requesting the survey link be forwarded 
to the relevant team in capitals as well as legal staff and advisors in Geneva. The email and the survey 
instrument stressed that the software used anonymized responses, making clear that the research team 
would not ask personal information and would not have access to personal information (such as IP 
addresses) either. In addition to WTO delegations, the survey was sent to legal practitioners, the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and 
the WEF (World Economic Forum), in all cases with a request to pass on the survey to others engaged 
in or concerned with WTO dispute settlement.  
A total of 168 responses were received. We count as “responses received” all cases where a 
respondent has answered to at least one question of the survey excluding the ones about the respondent's 
professional affiliation and the nationality of her organization. Fiorini et al. (2019) reports the number 
of responses for each question. Overall only 25% of the WTO member countries responded to the 
survey, defined as a response by a government official based in Geneva or in the capital.8 Thus, most 
WTO members did not respond. Some non-responders are large and systemically important. They are 
active in DS debates and presumably decided not to respond to the survey. Non-responders include the 
United States, although non-government groups based in the US jointly comprised the largest number 
of distinct responses from any country.9 The US is of course a very active user of the DSU and 
                                                     
6 These are available at: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx. 
7 In a number of instances, a WTO Member may speak on behalf of a group of Members, many of which may in turn 
intervene individually. We only count those Members that intervene. Mexico intervenes most frequently in the 2017-19 
period as a “speaker” for other WTO Members. It did so 7 times on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, 
Guatemala, Peru and itself as a proponent of WT/DSB/W/596 calling for the launch of selection processes to replace 
departing AB members, and 20 times on behalf of a group of Members supporting immediate new appointments to the AB, 
which eventually included 88 WTO Members, counting the EU as one (WT/DSB/W/609 and its 14 revisions). Nigeria and 
South Africa intervened 5 times during this period on behalf of the Africa Group. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba and 
Ecuador took turns to speak on behalf of the GRULAC group of countries. 
8 We define WTO membership in calculating shares as a total of 136 members: 164 – 28 EU member states. Of the 28 EU 
member states, only 6 government officials (in Geneva or capitals) responded to the survey. 
9 Dominated by law firms, which accounted for 40% of US-based responses. 
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participant in the DSB discussions on AB appointments. This is not the case for most WTO members 
that did respond to the survey.  
Response rates to similar surveys are often low, but in this case, the low level of response is quite 
surprising. The questionnaire targeted a small group only – governments and professionals directly 
concerned with the issues addressed in the survey. The subject (the imminent demise of the AB), was a 
high profile issue in the Geneva trade community at the time the survey was run. Potential reasons for 
the low response rate could include a genuine lack of interest; lack of capacity; time constraints; and/or 
deliberate decisions not to participate. A total of 78 respondents opened the survey, but opted not to 
answer any of the questions.  
Time constraints are not a likely factor explaining the low response rate, as the survey was open for 
3 months and took about 10 minutes to fill in. Capacity constraints are also not likely to be a factor, 
given that the survey was sent to delegations that represent their countries at the WTO and the questions 
were simple yes/no questions. Many of the respondents that did fill in the survey are from developing 
countries, including LDCs, also suggesting capacity was not a constraint. Lack of interest or a perception 
that the matter on which views were solicited (the AB, WTO DS) is not regarded to be of sufficient 
importance seems likely. The potential salience of this hypothesis is strengthened by the analysis of 
participation in WTO DSB deliberations in Section 3 below. 
The sample divides evenly between respondents located in high-income countries as opposed to low- 
and middle-income nations. About one-third (32%) of respondents are government officials.10 The 
geographic/national income distribution of respondents across professional groups is heterogeneous. 
Almost 60% of the government respondents based in Geneva are from high-income countries, and less 
than half (8 respondents) represent developing economies. The latter are relatively imbalanced by 
geography: two-thirds (6 respondents) represent Latin American countries. Only one African and one 
Asian Geneva-based official completed the questionnaire. 
  
                                                     
10 The coverage of government views may be greater than this as some respondents who did not identify a professional 
affiliation are likely to be retired officials. The majority of respondents in this “not specified” group indicated that they are 
based in a high-income country. 
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Figure 1: Professional Affiliation of Survey Respondents 
 
A similar pattern emerges for capital-based government officials. The share located in high-income 
countries drops to little less than 50%, while those located in developing nations account for almost 50% 
of responses. Four capital-based government officials did not specify their nationality. Inverting the 
pattern observed for responses by Geneva-based delegations, developing country officials in capitals are 
predominately from Africa (all but one of all respondents in this category who indicated their 
nationality). No Geneva-based official from India completed the survey, but one capital-based official 
from that country did. No government official representing the United States or China responded. We 
do not know the location of EU Commission respondents (Geneva or Brussels).11 Twelve of the 15 
respondents affiliated with law firms are based in high-income countries, with the majority located in 
North America and Brussels; one is based in India. Conversely, almost half of all business-affiliated 
respondents are based in developing countries. 35% of academic and CSO respondents are based in 
developing economies. 
3. Revealed Preferences: Participation in the WTO 
The main players in WTO DS are the major trading powers: the US, China and the EU. These three 
actors accounted for one-third of the total number of DS cases launched in the 2017-19 period, which is 
our reference period as it coincides with the apex of the crisis at the AB (Table 1). Large WTO members 
brought most complaints—two thirds of the total involved countries (blocs) with a GDP exceeding 
US$ 1 trillion. Overall, only 25 of 136 WTO members (counting the EU28 as one) brought at least one 
complaint, of which 17 launched more than one. Thus, almost 20% of the membership brought a dispute 
in a 3-year period; some 80% of the membership did not.12  
  
                                                     
11 We arbitrarily count all respondents indicating they work for an EU institution to the category of capital-based government 
officials for some of the analysis that follows, but report this group separately as well. 
12 Countries engaged in foreign policy conflicts that have generated trade policy disputes – Russia, Ukraine and Qatar are 
example – account for one-sixth of disputes in 2017-19. 
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Table 1: Use of WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Complainants, 2017-19 
 Complaints  
2017-2019 
GDP 
(current US$ bn) 
Globalization 
Index 
GDP per capita  
(current US$, thousand) 
Share of world 
exports (%) 
USA 12 20,494 82 
62.6 9.9 
China 6 13,608 64 
9.8 18.6 
EU 5 18,749 n.a. 
36.5 15.7 
Canada 5 1,709 84 
46.2 3.0 
South Korea 4 1,619 79 
31.4 4.5 
Russia 4 1,658 72 
11.3 2.7 
Ukraine 4 131 74 
3.1 0.4 
Qatar 4 192 73 
69.0 0.4 
Japan 3 4,971 78 
39.3 5.2 
Brazil 3 1.869 59 
8.9 1.7 
Mexico 2 1,224 71 
9.7 3.2 
Vietnam 2 245 64 
2.6 1.7 
UAE 2 414 74 
43.0 1.1 
Australia 2 1,432 82 
57.3 1.9 
Turkey 2 767 71 
9.3 1.3 
Tunisia 2 40 67 
3.4 0.1 
Venezuela 2 482 54 
16.1 0.2 
Chinese Taipei 1 589 n.a. 
24.0 2.7 
India 1 2,726 61 
2.0 2.3 
Switzerland 1 706 91 
82.8 2.3 
Thailand 1 505 71 
7.3 1.7 
Indonesia 1 1,042 63 
3.9 1.5 
Norway 1 435 86 
81.8 0.9 
Argentina 1 519 66 
11.7 0.5 
Guatemala 1 79 63 
4.5 0.1 
  
Average GDP  
(current US$ bn) 
Globalization 
Index 
Average p.c. GDP  
(current US$ ‘000) 
Share of world 
exports 
Complainants  3048 72 27.1 83.5 
Non-complainants 70 58 8.6 14.3 
Note: Shares of world exports are computed considering the EU as a single entity and therefore accounting only for extra-EU trade. Source: 
WTO and World Development Indicators. Trade data are from CEPII BACI data and WTO TPR 2018 Trade Profiles of Chinese Taipei, 
Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia for which bilateral trade is not reported in the BACI data. 
This observation is not specific to the time period considered. Johannesson and Mavroidis (2016) and 
Leitner and Lester (2017) report data use of WTO dispute settlement starting in 1995 and document that 
the large trading powers bring a disproportionate number of complaints. Updating the Johannesson and 
Mavroidis dataset to the end of October 2019, the US and the EU acted as complainants in 129 and 102 
of the total 590 complaints, and were defendants in 155 and 85 cases, respectively. This observation ties 
well with the finding in Horn et al. (2005) that the volume of export trade is the best predictor of the 
number DS complaints brought by WTO Members. In general, complainants tend to be bigger, more 
open and integrated (as measured by the Globalization Index) and richer than non-complainants.13 
Turning to participation in discussions on AB appointments and DS reform in the DSB, we observe 
a less concentrated picture. Table 2 reports the number of times Members intervened in the DSB on the 
need for AB appointments and the procedures linked to appointing a new AB member. Thirty-seven 
WTO Members (27%) intervened 5 or more times in the DSB on these agenda items during 2017-19, 
the period in which the US blocked new appointments. Eighty two (60%) did not intervene at all – a 
percentage that is less than the share of WTO Members that did not launch DS cases during this period.
                                                     
13 We use the overall index for 2016 of the KOF Globalization Index, a composite index measuring globalization for every 
country in the world along the economic, social and political dimension. See Gygli et al. (2019). 
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Table 2: Interventions in the DSB 
 Total interventions 
2017-2019 
GDP 
(current US$ bn) 
Globalization 
Index 
GDP per capita (current 
US$, ‘000) 
Share of world 
exports (%) 
Mexico 66 1,224 71 9.7 3.2 
USA 52 20,494 82 62.6 9.9 
EU 48 18,749 n.a. 36.5 15.7 
China 43 13,608 64 9.8 18.6 
Canada 43 1,709 84 46.2 3.0 
Australia 39 1,432 82 57.3 1.9 
Japan 37 4,971 78 39.3 5.2 
Brazil 35 1,869 59 8.9 1.7 
New Zealand 33 205 78 42.0 0.3 
Norway 31 435 86 81.8 0.9 
Singapore 30 364 83 64.6 1.7 
Switzerland 29 706 91 82.8 2.3 
South Korea 28 1,620 79 31.4 4.5 
Chinese Taipei 28 589 n.a. 24.0 2.7 
India 26 2,726 61 2.0 2.3 
Hong Kong 23 363 68 48.7 1.0 
Chile 23 298 77 15.9 0.6 
Turkey 20 767 71 9.3 1.3 
Russia 19 1,658 72 11.3 2.7 
Thailand 16 505 71 7.3 1.7 
Pakistan 13 313 54 1.5 0.2 
Uruguay 13 60 73 17.3 0.1 
Colombia 12 330 64 6.7 0.3 
Costa Rica 12 60 72 12.0 0.1 
Honduras 12 24 63 2.5 0.1 
Ecuador 11 108 60 6.3 0.1 
Guatemala 11 79 63 4.5 0.1 
Venezuela 11 482 54 16.1 0.2 
South Africa 9 366 70 6.4 0.7 
Indonesia 7 1,042 63 3.9 1.5 
Philippines 7 331 67 3.1 0.7 
Panama 7 65 72 15.6 <0.1 
Ukraine 6 131 74 3.1 0.4 
Peru 6 222 69 6.9 0.4 
Argentina 5 519 66 11.7 0.5 
Egypt 5 251 63 2.5 0.2 
Cuba 5 97 59 8.5 <0.1 
Nigeria 4 397 54 2.0 0.4 
Dominican Rep.  4 81 66 7.7 0.1 
El Salvador 4 26 67 4.1 <0.1 
Vietnam 3 245 64 2.6 1.7 
Israel 3 370 77 41.6 0.4 
Qatar 2 192 73 69.0 0.4 
Jamaica 2 16 66 5.4 <0.1 
Uganda 2 28 53 0.6 <0.1 
Morocco 1 119 69 3.2 0.2 
Kazakhstan 1 171 64 9.3 0.4 
Paraguay 1 41 63 5.9 0.1 
Afghanistan 1 19 39 0.5 <0.1 
Cameroon 1 39 50 1.5 <0.1 
Benin 1 10 50 0.9 <0.1 
Zambia 1 27 57 1.5 0.1 
Zimbabwe 1 31 51 2.1 <0.1 
Guyana 1 3.6 54 4.6 <0.1 
  
Average GDP  
(current US$ bn) 
Globalization  
Index 
Average p.c. GDP  
(current US$ ‘000) 
Share of world 
exports 
Participating WTO Members 1,492 67 18.2 90.3 
Non-participating WTO Members 41.7 56 7.9 7.5 
Source: Minutes of DSB meetings (WT/DSB/M/*); World Bank World Development Indicators. Trade data are from CEPII BACI data and 
WTO TPR 2018 Trade Profiles of Chinese Taipei, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia for which bilateral trade is not reported by CEPII. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827215
WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members’ Revealed Preferences 
European University Institute 9 
Virtually all WTO Members that brought a DS case during 2017-19, also participated in DSB debates 
during this time – the only exceptions are Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. As is the case with 
users of the DSU, participants in DSB discussions on AB appointments are larger, more open and richer 
than non-participants, but we also observe more engagement by smaller and poorer countries. As noted 
previously, in some instances a country spoke on behalf of a group. This is the case in particular for 
Mexico, which intervened regularly in DSB meetings on behalf of a proposal that over time came to be 
supported by 88 WTO members (counting the EU as one) calling for new appointments to the AB.. 
Although more than a dozen countries with trade shares below 0.1% of world trade, including several 
African LDCs, participated in DSB deliberations, the general pattern is one of countries in Africa and 
the Middle East engaging less than developing countries in other regions.14 
There is a marked difference between the period of the negotiation of the Uruguay round, and today. 
The bulk of the negotiation in the Uruguay Round on the DSU involved an EU-US back and forth, 
although several other members played a role, and on occasion a decisive one. Canada, for example, 
was instrumental in bringing about the AB as discussed in Hoekman and Mavroidis (2019a). 
Nevertheless, only the EU and the US voiced their claims with respect to each and every provision that 
ultimately found its way into the DSU. Conversely, today numerous WTO members have expressed 
their views, often on more than one occasion, regarding the workings of the DSU. 
4. Insider Perceptions: The Survey 
Turning to the survey results, of the 136 WTO members (counting the EU as one), a key feature is that 
only 25 governments responded, i.e., at least one official – whether Geneva- or capital-based – filed in 
the questionnaire (Table 3).15 Across all professional groupings and including instances where no 
professional affiliation was provided (i.e., not specified), the responses span 48 countries.16 For 13 of 
these countries responses where received from business representatives or law firms. 
Focusing on government responses and comparing the WTO members that participated with those 
that did not, we once again observe that the relatively larger, more open (integrated) and richer countries 
participated more on average. However, compared with DSU and DSB participation, the differences 
between the two categories are less. More small countries are represented, and fewer large economies, 
reflecting the absence of responses from government officials from China, Japan and the United States. 
Large emerging economies such as Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, and Argentina that are active in the DSU 
and DSB did not participate in the survey at all. 
A commonality across the three sources of data is that, most countries in Africa and the Middle East 
did not engage.17 Asian countries, on the other hand, participated less frequently in the survey than in 
the DSB/DSU. Only 13 of the 25 WTO Members that were DSU complainants in 2017-19 had 
government officials fill in the questionnaire. Of the 37 WTO members that intervened at least 5 times 
in DSB discussions on AB appointments and DS reform, only 14 had government officials that 
responded to the survey. In order to further investigate the relationship between participation in the 
system and survey participation, we have estimated the simple correlation between the country-level 
binary indicator, taking value 1 if at least one government official of the country took the survey 
(GVT_respondent_dummy), and two dummy variables taking value one respectively if the country acted 
as complainant at least once between 2017 and 2019 (Complainant_dummy), and if it intervened at least 
once during the same period in the formal discussions on AB appointment, DSB reform and related 
                                                     
14 World trade shares are computed using only extra-EU trade, i.e., taking the EU28 as one.. 
15 As stated previously, we count the EU as one here, and therefore disregard instances where government representatives of 
EU member states responded to the survey. 
16 This total includes individual EU member states. 
17 We again have 7 African countries participating, although the composition of this group changes relative to the DSB 
sample: the largest African economies that do participate in the DSB (South Africa and Nigeria) did not respond to the 
survey. 
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policy issues (Intervention_dummy). The correlation between GVT_respondent_dummy and 
Complainant_dummy is equal to 0.3585, while the correlation between GVT_respondent_dummy and 
Intervention_dummy is 0.2914. These correlations are both relatively low, indicating that responses by 
governments to the survey are not dominated by WTO members that are active participants in the DSU 
and DSB discussions. 
Table 3: WTO members with at least one Government official responding to the survey) 
 GDP 
(current US$ bn) 
Globalization Index 
GDP per capita (current US$, 
thousands) 
Share of world 
exports 
EU 18,749 n.a. 36.5 15.7 
France 2,778 87 41.5 NA 
Canada 1,709 84 46.2 3.0 
South Korea 1,619 79 31.4 4.5 
Belgium 532 91 46.6 NA 
Chinese Taipei 589 n.a. 24.0 2.7 
India 2,726 61 2.0 2.3 
Switzerland 706 91 82.8 2.3 
Vietnam 245 64 2.6 1.7 
UAE 414 74 43.0 1.1 
Australia 1,432 82 57.3 1.9 
Austria 456 89 51.5 NA 
Brazil 1,869 59 8.9 1.7 
Czech Rep. 244 85 23.1 NA 
Sweden 551 90 54.1 NA 
Hungary 156 85 15.9 NA 
Norway 435 86 81.8 0.9 
Israel 370 77 41.6 0.4 
Chile 298 77 15.9 0.6 
New Zealand 205 78 42.0 0.3 
Guatemala 79 63 4.5 0.1 
Kenya 88 55 1.7 <0.1 
Costa Rica 60 72 12.0 <0.1 
Paraguay 41 63 5.9 0.1 
Venezuela 482 54 16.1 0.2 
Tanzania 57 51 1.1 <0.1 
Cote d'Ivoire 43 53 1.7 0.1 
Zimbabwe 31 51 2.1 <0.1 
Uganda 28 53 0.6 <0.1 
Burkina Faso 14 52 0.7 <0.1 
Malawi 7 49 0.4 <0.1 
 
Average GDP  
(current US$ bn) 
Globalization Index 
Average p.c. GDP  
(current US$ ‘000) 
Share of world 
exports 
Responding govts 1,194 71 25.7 39.7 
Nonresponding govts 494 63 13.9 58.1 
Note: EU member states in italics. Shares of world exports are computed considering the EU as a single entity and therefore accounting only 
for extra-EU trade. Because of this the shares of world exports for EU member states are not applicable (NA). The export shares in the last two 
rows do not account for EU member states. 
Source: Survey and World Development Indicators. Trade data are from CEPII BACI data and WTO TPR 2018 Trade Profiles of Chinese 
Taipei, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia for which bilateral trade is not reported in the BACI data. 
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5. Survey Findings 
In a nutshell, the survey responses suggest two main conclusions: 
 First, the WTO Membership as such, seems quite happy with the current design of WTO DS. 
There are no major qualms regarding the basic features of the DSU. 
 Second, some of the WTO Membership is quite concerned with the manner in which the AB has 
exercised discretion within the current DS design. With respect to practice, the best way to 
describe the reactions of the Membership is ‘polarization’: some Members signal concerns, while 
many others do not see much wrong with the output of the AB.  
This suggests practice rather than design is at issue. The purpose of this paper is not to analyze the 
drivers or the rationale for the different views let alone whether they make sense or not. On the other 
hand, we do observe that the US is in a minority of one when it comes to deciding on the optimal course 
of action to address its concerns. While some WTO Members are ready to acknowledge that some of 
the issues raised are worth debating, none is prepared to support the US in its decision to prevent new 
appointments to the AB. The proposal by 88 members to complete the AB by electing new members, 
and the total isolation of the US in this regard, clearly illustrates this divide. 
5.1 Consensus on Many Dimensions 
A large majority of survey respondents regard the AB, as such, and WTO dispute settlement in more 
general terms, to be of critical importance to the functioning of the world trading system. For political 
economy reasons, governments may have the incentive to renege on negotiated commitments. 
Enforcement is necessary because the GATT (and the other agreements coming under the aegis of the 
WTO, which largely emulate the GATT approach to trade liberalization), is an incomplete contract. 
Since re-negotiation is very onerous (in light of the number of participants, their heterogeneity, the 
consensus working practice, etc.), adjudication may be perceived as the only feasible option to 
“complete” the contract and allow it to produce its intended results.18 The persuasion that the DSU is of 
utmost importance to the trading community is underscored by many responses to survey questions. 
Here we highlight the most salient ones where there is broad agreement (see Figure 2): 
 The AB impasse is of systemic importance, and it is not simply a tiff between EU and US (Q1);19 
 WTO DS is not just a matter of power, but serves important functions of interest to the world 
community irrespective of size of litigants (Q19);  
 Alternatives to the current DS are not a substitute to the existing regime (Q21);  
 Panelist appointments have been objective and unbiased (Q9);  
 Panel reports should be binding. The world community thus, continues to support negative 
consensus, the most important highlight reform agreed during the Uruguay round (Q10; Q15);  
 WTO adjudicators should be very circumspect in interpreting the WTO rules (Q3);  
 DS/AB is valuable for legal clarification, creating precedent, ensuring predictability, enforcement 
of commitments (Q14s1; Q14s3; Q14s4); and  
 The AB must provide coherent case law (Q11). 
There is an important qualification to make with respect interpreting revealed preferences as reflected 
in responses to the survey as it does tell us anything about the views of the countries that did not respond 
                                                     
18 This arguably is too narrow a view given that other forms of dispute resolution are available to WTO Members, such as 
raising specific trade concerns in Committees. Bolstering the use of such alternative mechanisms to defuse conflicts and 
resolve concerns is arguably one important dimension of WTO reform. 
19 The question numbers in parentheses (Qx) refer to the survey instrument and are reported to facilitate cross-referencing 
with the detailed descriptions of the questions asked and responses received provided in Fiorini et al. (2019). 
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to the survey. Those who decided not to fill in the questionnaire and countries that do not use the system 
may have different assumptions on these issues. The many non-respondents may be at the opposite end 
from those actively engaged in the system.  
We turn next to a discussion of reactions to questions regarding practice of the AB. 
Figure 2: Virtual consensus on key dimensions of the DSU 
  
Panel A: [Question 15] A compulsory and binding 
dispute settlement system and automatic adoption of 
reports is a necessary feature of the trade system  
Panel B: [Question 1] The Appellate Body impasse 
largely concerns the EU and the US, so we are staying 
out of it. 
  
Panel C: [Question 14(1)] DS is valuable for legal 
clarification; to create a precedent  
 




Panel E: [Question 14 (4)] DS is valuable for 
enforcing commitments  
Panel F: [Question 11] Does the WTO need the 
Appellate Body to ensure coherent case law?  
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5.2 Disagreements and Polarization 
A substantial number of respondents believe DS is not doing what it should be doing, and/or is not 
consistently delivering high quality output (Figure 3). Notwithstanding a large majority view that 
panelists are appointed through an objective process (Q9), 55% of respondents (77 out of 139 who 
answered this question) believe that panel reports are sometimes biased. 70% of Geneva based officials 
who are involved in DS take this view, as do over 50% of officials based in capitals (Q30).20 Overall, 
42% of respondents believe the AB has gone beyond its mandate, violating the quintessential obligation 
established in the DSU (Article 3.2) to not undo the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the 
Membership. 
This provision encapsulates the idea that panels and the AB are agents not principals, and they must 
abide by the agency contract, which they have adhered to. Nevertheless, because of the 
“incompleteness” of the original contract, this emerges as probably the hardest discipline to observe. In 
case of egregious violations, it might be easy to pronounce in favor of disrespect of the mandate. But 
the majority of issues raised are borderline cases. This is precisely what might explain why, 
notwithstanding the agreement of some with the US on this score, there is disagreement of all with the 
US on the appropriate course of action to address the situation.21 
Unpacking Agreement and Disagreement 
With regard to the professional affiliations of those who took the survey, it is notable that government 
officials based in Geneva involved in DS, and practitioners in law firms, have expressed the view that 
the AB has gone beyond its mandate (50% and 60%, respectively) (Q2) (Figure 4). 
Many business respondents and legal practitioners believe that the AB has not provided coherent 
case law (40% and 50%, respectively). 30% of officials in capitals dealing with DS think the AB has 
not provided coherent case law either (Q12). Finally, 44% of respondents believe the AB has always 
acted consistently with the DSU (Q13). The two issues (consistency with the DSU, coherence) are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive: one can imagine a consistent with the DSU incoherent case law, as the 
AB could be adopting for example a more or less deferential standard of review when dealing with say 
consumer protection cases. 
More than three-quarters of delegation officials based in Geneva who are directly involved in DS, 
agree that the AB has at times acted inconsistently with the DSU. Insiders (those involved in DS and 
thus presumably better informed) are less positive than others (Q13). In part, this critique implicates the 
Secretariat as well. 61% of all respondents (87 out of 142) think that AB reports are written by the 
Secretariat. This share is higher for respondents who work on DS, as 80% of law firm respondents and 
officials based in Geneva adhere to this view. Capital based officials are the outlier here: ‘only’ 40% 
agree with the statement (Q31). 
  
                                                     
20 Some potential implications of views by a non-negligible share of insiders/stakeholders that there is a quality/competence 
problem are addressed in Hoekman and Mavroidis (2019b). 
21 An equally tantalizing question is whether the Membership should focus on ex post or ex ante remedies to redress the 
current situation, We did not include questions to this effect in the survey, since this is the bridge we should be crossing 
assuming consensus to sit down and talk. For now, there is none. 
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Figure 3: Polarization 
  
Panel A: [Question 30] Are panel reports sometimes 
biased?  
Panel B: [Question 12] Has the Appellate Body in fact 
provided coherent case law?  
  
Panel C: [Question 13] Has the AB always acted 
consistently with the DSU?  
Panel D: [Question 2] Has the AB gone beyond its 
boundaries? 
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Figure 4: Unpacking polarization 
  
Panel A: [Question 30] Are panel reports sometimes 
biased?  
Panel B: [Question 12] Has the Appellate Body in 
fact provided coherent case law?  
  
Panel C: [Question 13] Has the AB always acted 
consistently with the DSU?  
Panel D: [Question 2] Has the AB gone beyond its 
boundaries? 
 
Panel E: [Question 31] Do you think that AB reports are written by the Secretariat? 
 
Table 4 offers a graphical representation of agreement/disagreement patterns among responses to 
questions across types of respondents (i.e., different professional affiliations).22 The rows of the table 
report the main questions with a Yes/No answer structure. Columns report professional affiliations. For 
a combination of question and professional affiliation, if the group-specific average response is 
statistically higher (lower) than the average response of all other respondents, the respective cell in the 
                                                     
22 Fiorini et al. (2019) provides granular information on responses to questions across professional categories. 
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table is colored green (red). If the group-specific average response is not statistically different from the 
average response of all other respondents, then the cell is colored orange. For each row (question), the 
same color for two or more columns reflects agreement among the respective groups of respondents. 
The analysis comprises the following steps. First, responses to the questions with a Yes/No answer 
structure are recoded to take the numeric value 0 if "No" and 1 if "Yes". Second, for each group of 
respondents (defined based on professional affiliation) we compute (i) the group-specific average 
response, taking the average of individual numerical responses within the group; and (ii) the average 
response of all other respondents excluding respondents from that group. Third, we test the relationship 
between (i) and (ii). If, for a given group and a given question, (i) is statistically higher (lower) that (ii), 
that group will be on average more (less) in favor to the statement expressed in the question than all 
other respondents. Thus, “agreement” is defined as instances where two or more groups have group-
specific average responses that demonstrate the same relationship with the average response of all other 
respondents. The nature of these relationships is estimated using mean difference analysis with a 
statistical significance of 95%. 
Some suggestive patterns emerge from Table 4. On the question whether the AB has gone beyond 
its mandate (Q2), government officials in Geneva and law firms tend to agree which each other and with 
this proposition than other groups, and in particular with capital-based officials (including the EU) who 
are more inclined to answer no to this question. This pattern repeats for the question whether panelists 
are objective and panel reports are unbiased ((Q9; Q30) and whether the WTO Secretariat writes AB 
reports (Q31): Geneva-based officials tend to be more skeptical than capital-based officials are. Geneva 
delegates also less inclined than other groups to agree that the AB has always acted consistently with 
the DSU (Q13) and that DS is valuable for legal clarification and to create precedent (Q14:1). The latter 
suggests that Geneva officials may be more inclined to regard the role of DS procedures as resolving 
disputes than other groups – e.g., business respondents and law firms who tend to take the view that DS 
should punish “cheaters” (viz. Q14:15).  
Business representatives tend to be more negative than average on whether panelists are objective 
and unbiased (Q9), on whether their governments use WTO monitoring and notification information: a 
majority of business respondents believe their governments do not analyze other countries trade policies 
with a view to raising a question in a WTO body (Q18). In other work, Wolfe (2019) comments on the 
propensity of Members to raise a “specific trade concern” or ask a question about another Member’s 
notification. What we find in the survey suggests that the business perception is not wrong: countries 
with sophisticated alert systems and good internal coordination receive more comments from industry 
and other ministries hence launch more disputes, raise more STCs and ask more questions than other 
Members.  
Business representatives are also more skeptical about the value of the DSU in delivering outcomes: 
they are more inclined to believe that power determines outcomes (Q19), that the DS is too expensive 
(Q20), and that alternative mechanisms, including consultations and PTA fora are better or preferable 
(Q4, Q5, Q21). Business is an outlier in that a significant share of respondents agreeing that DS is 
irrelevant because conflict resolution reflects power relationships (Q19). We are not surprised by the 
results, as large businesses have the means to raise their concerns directly with a government without 
waiting for a WTO dispute settlement process to conclude. 
Some 60% of business respondents prefer bilateral consultations over the WTO ‘court’ (40% in the 
case of associations in high-income nations; 100% of those based in developing countries) (Q4). 
Consistent with this is that business is somewhat more positive about PTAs as a forum to address 
disputes than other stakeholders, especially associations based in developing countries (Q5). Some 
business respondents are an outlier in stating that WTO DS is not relevant because alternative 
mechanisms are used (Q21). 50%-60% of business respondents think DS is a valuable alternative to 
negotiations, vs. 30% of government officials in capitals expressing this view (Q14s2). Business is the 
only group consistently taking the view that one role of DS is to punish ‘cheaters’ (Q14s5). 
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Table 4: Agreement/Disagreement Within and Across Questions 
Note: all questions are Yes/No. If a group-specific average response is statistically higher (lower) than the average response 
of all other respondents the respective cell is colored green (red). If a group-specific average response is not statistically 
different from the average response it is orange. For each row (question), the same color for two or more columns reflects 





























































Q1: The AB impasse largely concerns the EU and US, so we are staying out of it 
         
Q2: Has the Appellate Body gone beyond its boundaries?  
         
Q3: WTO adjudicators should exercise great circumspection in interpreting the WTO 
         
Q4: We prefer bilateral consultations to using a “court” for inter-governmental agreements 
         
Q5: Free trade agreements offer a better forum to resolve disputes  
         
Q6: Has your country considered arbitration instead of WTO DS procedures? 
         
Q7: Does the WTO need a mediation mechanism?  
         
Q8: My country does not launch disputes if others have larger interests at stake than us 
         
Q9: Panelists appointed to dispute settlement panels are objective and unbiased  
         
Q10: Should WTO panel reports be binding? 
         
Q11: Does the WTO need the Appellate Body to ensure coherent case law? 
         
Q12: Do you think that the Appellate Body has in fact provided coherent case law? 
         
Q13: Has the Appellate Body always acted consistently with the DSU? 
         
Q14(1): Dispute settlement is valuable for legal clarification; to create a precedent 
         
Q14(2): Dispute settlement is valuable for being alternative to negotiations 
         
Q14(3): Dispute settlement is valuable for ensuring predictability 
         
Q14(4): Dispute settlement is valuable for enforcement of commitments 
         
Q14(5): Dispute settlement is valuable for punishing cheaters 
         
Q14(6): Dispute settlement is valuable for securing a mutually acceptable solution  
         
Q15: Compulsory & binding DS with automatic adoption of reports is necessary 
         
Q16: When officials in capitals assess if a new policy is consistent with WTO rules, do they pay attention to Appellate Body 
rulings?          
Q17: Does your delegation/ministry use WTO monitoring or Global Trade Alert data to identify trade barriers that could give 
rise to a dispute or a specific trade concern?          
Q18: Does your government analyze other Members’ trade policy notifications that could lead to a question in a WTO 
committee?          
Q19: Disputes are irrelevant as conflicts are settled by the power of the bigger market  
         
Q20: Dispute settlement is too expensive for my country 
         
Q21: Dispute settlement is not relevant because we use alternative mechanisms 
         
Q23: Our businesses are well-informed about foreign market access barriers 
         
Q24: Our businesses complain to the trade ministry about foreign market access barriers 
         
Q25: Our businesses don’t know if market access problems are due to foreign policies 
         
Q26: Do your WTO representatives intervene in DSB meetings? 
         
Q28: Does your country only intervene in the DSB if direct export interests are affected? 
         
Q29: Do your country’s DSB interventions address broad systemic issues? 
         
Q30: Are panel reports sometimes biased? 
         
Q31: Are Appellate Body reports written by the Secretariat? 
         
Q32: Should there be a page limit for Appellate Body reports? 
         
Q33: Should there be page limits on appeals by WTO Members? 
         
Q34: Would monetary damages enforceable in local courts boost interest in WTO dispute settlement? 
         
Law firms tend to agree more strongly with the statements that the AB has gone beyond its mandate 
(Q2), that panel reports should be binding and adopted automatically (Q10; Q15), that governments use 
WTO notifications to raise issues in WTO meetings (Q18), intervene in DSB meetings (Q26), and do 
so to address matters of systemic concern (Q29).  
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Respondents working in academia are neutral on key questions such as AB overreach (Q2), whether 
the AB should show great circumspection (Q3), on the use (utility) of PTAs and bilateral consultations 
to resolve disputes (Q4, Q5) or whether the AB should and does provide coherent case law (Q11, Q12). 
They tend to agree more strongly that panel reports should be binding (Q10), that the AB has tended to 
act consistently with its mandate (Q13), and that a role of the AB is to clarify the rules (Q14(1)). They 
also believe that businesses are not well informed about market access barriers and do not complain to 
trade ministries (Q23; Q24) – questions where governments take a relatively strong opposing view. 
Finally, academics are an outlier in being the only group to take a relatively positive view of the prospect 
that introducing monetary damages (remedies) would bolster interest in using the DSU (Q34).  
5.3 Determinants of DS Utilization and Development 
Fiorini et al. (2019) reports other cuts of the data that are salient to our hypotheses. One is to distinguish 
between respondents based on their location – developing vs. high-income countries. Another is to 
distinguish between respondents based on whether they are (have been) involved in WTO DS or not.  
Respondents in poor countries 
 are more inclined to agree that DS is too expensive (Q20);  
 prefer bilateral consultations over the WTO court (Q4), perceive that PTAs (preferential trade 
agreements) are better forum to resolve disputes (Q5);  
 believe that monetary damages as a remedy in DS cases would be desirable (Q34); and  
 more inclined to agree their country tends to free ride, wherever and whenever it is possible to do 
so (Q8).  
There are also clear splits across the rich-poor divide regarding whether:  
 businesses are well-informed on foreign market access barriers (rich: yes; poor; no) (Q23);  
 they are aware if policy is a cause of market access problems (rich: yes; poor: no) (Q25);  
 their delegations intervene in the DSB (rich: yes; poor: many say no) (Q26); and, if so, only do so 
to protect export interests (rich: no; poor: >50% say yes) 
Distinguishing between developing country and high-income countries is thus informative in revealing 
differences of view. Much of what the data reveal is consistent with theory and past empirical research. 
70% of government officials in capitals of developing countries, for instance, agree that their country 
does not launch disputes if other parties have larger interests at stake. This compares with less than 20% 
for government respondents in capitals of high-income countries (Q8). Moreover, 60% of Capital-based 
officials and all business respondents agree their country free rides in DSB meetings.23 
Differences in views depending on involvement in DS 
Many of the views expressed by respondent groups are not sensitive to the question whether a respondent 
has (had) direct involvement in the WTO DS. But on some questions, there are differences, and on 
occasion, pronounced differences. In part, this finding presumably reflects differences in knowledge of 
how the process works, but differences may also reflect differences in preferences. Questions where 
there are differences in views include preference for bilateral consultations and PTA mechanisms to deal 
with trade disputes (Q4; Q5), where those involved in WTO DS are somewhat less inclined to agree 
these alternatives offer a better forum than those who are not. Insiders are also less likely to agree that 
their country tends to free ride on others (Q8) and more likely to agree that panelist appointments are 
sometimes biased (Q9). Particularly striking is the difference on Q20 (is DS too expensive): those 
involved in DS tend to say No, while others are more likely to agree (which may help explain why they 
                                                     
23 The questions regarding freeriding are not included in Table 4 given the low response rates. 
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are not users). This difference may reflect better knowledge of insiders, but may also reflect self-interest. 
Similarly, on Q26 (does your country intervene in DSB meetings), insiders are much more inclined to 
agree than those not involved in DS. Finally, insiders are much less supportive of adoption of monetary 
damages as a remedy. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The main takeaway from the stylized facts regarding the use of the DSU and participation in DSB 
deliberations, as well as the survey response rates is that WTO DS is primarily of significant interest to 
the major trade powers, more open and richer countries. Most WTO members are missing in action, 
even when that taking action would have an opportunity close to zero – i.e., filling in a survey that takes 
about 10 minutes to complete. We interpret this as reflecting limited interest in – and concern about – 
the continued operation of the AB. We are skeptical that the high survey non-response rate and limited 
participation in the DSB reflects capacity constraints. More likely is that the limited engagement is 
reflects small stakes; free riding; and/or perceptions that WTO DS is of limited utility. 
The survey results suggest that when it comes to fundamental questions regarding the role, scope and 
design of WTO DS procedures there is a virtual consensus across WTO Members and stakeholders (of 
course, conditional on the self-selection associated with those who responded). There is agreement that 
the two-stage process that was negotiated in the Uruguay Round is what is needed and that an appeals 
body is desirable. Although we refrained from asking about specific issues that have been raised by the 
United States and that are the focus of the Walker process – in order to allow the questionnaire to be 
filled in by trade officials and stakeholders who are not inside the “DS kitchen” but do deal with the 
WTO – the survey responses also suggest that the US is not alone in considering that the AB has at times 
gone beyond its mandate. Moreover, many stakeholders have concerns that go beyond the AB and 
pertain to WTO DS more broadly, including the first (panel) stage, the preconditions that need to be 
satisfied in order to participate/use the DSU, and the salience of other dispute resolution processes, both 
within the WTO (committees; STCs) and outside the WTO (bilateral consultations; use of PTAs). 
The data suggest close to consensus on the basic design of the DSU as crafted in the Uruguay Round 
(Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2019a), but significant polarization in perceptions on the performance of the 
AB. Although as of October 2019 a total of 88 WTO members (counting the EU as one) had signed on 
to the proposal to appoint new AB members expeditiously, this leaves 47 WTO members that have not 
expressed such a view. Most of these countries are small or poor, but there are a few outliers, notably 
Japan.24 
It is not the purpose of this paper to propose solutions to the AB deadlock. Responses to our 
questionnaire do not suggest a solution (respondents were not asked to do so), but is seems clear that 
there are substantive questions that need to be addressed if the Appellate Body impasse is to be resolved. 
The survey responses suggest that efforts to do so need to involve greater willingness by WTO Members 
to identify and discuss substantive concerns about the operation of the system.  
WTO Members need to go beyond this and reflect on the current institutional design of DS processes 
and the operation of the DSU, including the quality of panelists/AB members, the support they are given, 
and putting in place meaningful performance review procedures. Some of these matters have been the 
subject of discussion in the long-standing review of the DSU. The state of play in efforts to review and 
update DS procedures were summarized by Ambassador Coly Seck (Senegal) in June 2019 in a 123-
page document (TN/DS/31) providing his overall assessment of the ongoing negotiations on DS reform. 
                                                     
24 In DSB meetings Japan has supported the proposal – e.g., the DSB meeting of 28.01.2019 – but Japan has not formally 
joined the proposal. Instead it has stressed that DSB is tasked with achieving a satisfactory settlement of disputes and urged 
Members to further discuss this matter in the DSB as well as “other issues with regard to the proper functioning of the 
dispute settlement mechanism in due course” (WTO JOB/DSB/3, 18 April 2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827215
Matteo Fiorini, Bernard Hoekman, Petros Mavroidis, Maarja Saluste and Robert Wolfe 
20 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
The need for consensus has impeded a resolution on the matters raised. Some of the more fundamental 
issues that emerge from the survey are not even on the table in these long-running negotiations.25 
As argued elsewhere, internal working practices are a core part of any WTO reform agenda 
(Bertelsmann, 2018; Hoekman, 2019). When it comes to the DSU, it is also important is to consider 
whether there is a need to address the factors that underlie the lack of interest by most WTO members 
in the DSU. Insofar as the majority do not see DS as being useful to them, this reduces the value of 
membership and the benefits of a rules-based trading system. In separate work, similar concerns about 
participation in the alternative form of managing conflict in the WTO, by raising a specific trade concern 
(Wolfe, 2019). 
  
                                                     
25 The subjects of focus in these deliberations included (1) Mutually agreed solutions, (2) Third-party rights, (3) Strictly 
confidential information, (4) Sequencing, (5) Post-retaliation, (6) Transparency and amicus curiae briefs, (7) Timeframes, 
(8) Remand, (9) Panel composition, (10) Effective compliance, (11) Developing country interests, and (12) Flexibility and 
Member control. See WTO TN/DS/31. 
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